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“A well regarded Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right 
of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”2 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In our American Democracy, no law has sparked more criticism and debate with less 
guidance from the courts than the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  In the over 200 
years following its ratification, 3 the Second Amendment has only been interpreted by the U.S. 
Supreme Court a handful of times. 4  More significantly, in these few opinions, the Court has left 
open important questions regarding the nature and extent of the right.  Specifically, the Court has 
never decided whether the Amendment confers an individual or collective right, nor has the 
Court proposed a standard of review under which allegedly infringing laws can be evaluated.  
Both of these outstanding questions present significant problems for our nation, given that at the 
end of the twentieth century, reports state that “75 to 86 million [Americans] own a total of about 
200 to 240 million guns.”5  The Supreme Court, however, finally seems poised to define at least 
some of the contours of the Amendment in District of Columbia v. Heller, 6 a case that 
Constitutional Law scholars have already predicted will be a landmark decision.7 
In deciding District of Columbia v. Heller, the United States Supreme Court should 
affirm the D.C. Circuit’s adoption of a Second Amendment individual rights analysis.  
Furthermore, the Court should classify the individual right as fundamental and specifically 
announce that the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense.  
Additionally, the Court should hold that the “undue burden” test should be the default framework 
under which the constitutionality of firearms legislation will be scrutinized, subject to certain 
categorical regulations. 
This Article first provides background on the key issues involved in the Second 
Amendment debate: whether the Second Amendment confers an individual or collective right to 
keep and bear arms,8 and whether the Second Amendment right should be subject to strict 
scrutiny, reasonable regulation / rational basis review, undue burden scrutiny, categorical 
regulation, or some other standard.9  The Article then explores the District of Columbia v. Heller 
litigation, which will certainly resolve the ‘nature of the right’ question, and perhaps even 
establish the appropriate standard of review.10  Thereafter, this Article proposes justifications for 
the Heller Court to hold that the Second Amendment protects an individual fundamental right to 
keep and bear arms for self-defense, and that acts infringing on the right be subject to undue 
burden scrutiny as modified by certain categorical restrictions.11  Finally, the Article analyzes 
how certain types of firearm legislation would be affected by this  proposed standard of review.12 
II. The Threshold Question: Who Holds the Rights Conferred By the Second 
Amendment? 
 
The threshold question in Second Amendment jurisprudence is ‘What kind of right is 
conferred by the Second Amendment?’  Although 200 years have passed since three-quarters of 
the several states ratified the Second Amendment, the Supreme Court has yet to answer this 
question.13  In the absence of meaningful guidance from the Court, lower federal and state courts 
have felt free to adopt their own theories as to the rights conferred by the Amendment.  Scholars, 
too, have joined in this debate on all sides, supporting and denouncing different decisions and 
publishing new theories about Second Amendment rights.  By and large, however, the models 
proposed and implemented by jurists and academics can be categorized into three predominate 
frameworks: the Collective Rights Model, the Limited Individual Rights (or Sophisticated 
Collective Rights) Model, and the Individual Rights Model.14  What follows is merely intended 
to give the reader a summary of the arguments for each model in order to understand the context 
of the debate in District of Columbia v. Heller – more complete elaborations of the models are 
available elsewhere. 
a. The Collective Rights Model 
 
The first theory, the Collective Rights Model, suggests that the Second Amendment 
confers onto states a collective right to possess and use firearms in order to establish and 
maintain state-sponsored militias.15  Supporters of this model, “collectivists,” espouse the view 
that citizens do not have an individual right to possess and use firearms.16  Collectivists believe 
that the state’s collective right follows from the text and history of the Amendment, Supreme 
Court precedent, notably the United States v. Miller decision, and the undesirable consequences 
that might result from recognition of an individual rights model. 
According to collectivists, the Collective Rights Model is the only framework supported 
by the text and history of the Second Amendment.  Proponents offer that the model is the only 
textually plausible conclusion from reading the Amendment’s preamble and the operative clause 
together.  Since the right to “keep and bear arms” is required of “[a] well regarded Militia” and is 
necessary to a “State[’s]” security, the Second Amendment must only confer a right upon the 
states, since only states maintain and regulate militias.  Furthermore, supporters believe that 
although the right is conferred upon the “people,” that term refers to the state militia and not to 
individual citizens.17  Proponents also offer that the circumstances surrounding the Amendment’s 
passage in Congress, namely its genesis as a compromise measure for antifederalists who 
otherwise refused to pass the original Constitution, reinforce the notion that the framers intended 
to memorialize a right held by states, not by individuals.  Since the antifederalists were 
concerned with the new federal government abusing its power over the states, and not states 
abusing their power over their citizens, collective rights proponents argue that the framers 
intended that the Second Amendment reserved rights to the states and not to individual citizens.  
Additionally, collective rights supporters point to late 18th Century American and English 
firearms prohibitions as evidence that at the time of the Second Amendment’s passage, the right 
to possess a firearm was not commonly understood to be an individual right.18 
Collective Rights Model supporters also point to the Supreme Court’s rationale in Miller 
and other cases, as well as the jurisprudence of most federal judicial circuit courts, in defending 
their model.  In United States v. Miller,19 the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision 
that the federal statute under which defendants were charged, banning the interstate 
transportation of unregistered firearms, violated defendants’ Second Amendment rights.20  
Specifically, collective rights advocates cite Miller’s language that “[without] evidence tending 
to show that possession or use of [the firearm at issue] has some reasonable relationship to the 
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment 
guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument” as supporting the collective, not 
individual, rights theory.21  Most federal courts have similarly interpreted Miller to endorse a 
collective right under the Second Amendment.22 
Finally, some collectivists support this model because they find federal and state 
regulation of firearms to be desirable or necessary for public safety.23  If the Second Amendment 
is found to protect collective rights, then presumably state laws restricting individual firearms 
possession and use will be upheld as not impugning Second Amendment rights.24  This 
conclusion follows, because any act by the holder of the collective right, the state, that might 
infringe upon its own rights would likely be seen as a waiver of the right and not a constitutional 
violation. 
This Collective Rights Model is the rule of law in a majority of federal appellate courts 
and is the view currently held by a minority of academics.  Within the past ten to twenty years, 
however, support for this model has eroded, notably from leading academics, state legislators, 
and state courts.25  This erosion has led most collectivists to alternatively endorse the Limited 
Individual Rights Model. 
b. The Individual Rights Model 
The Individual Rights Model espouses the view that the Second Amendment confers 
upon all citizens the individual right to keep and bear arms.  Supporters believe that these 
individual rights follow from the text and history of the Amendment, the common law tradition, 
and Supreme Court precedent. 
Like the collectivists, supporters of the Individual Rights Model, “individualists,” claim 
that their framework is the only possible conclusion supported by the text and history of the 
Second Amendment.  Individualists suggest that the individual nature of the right naturally 
follows from the Amendment’s reservation of the rights to “the people”, a constitutional term of 
art that is understood to mean “individuals” based upon its use both in the Bill of Rights and the 
Constitution generally.26  Furthermore, individualists suggest that the Second Amendment, as a 
whole, would be an “inexplicable aberration” if it, unlike the other first nine Bill of Rights 
Amendments, was found to not to protect an individual right.27  Additionally, state constitutions 
drafted soon after the U.S. Constitution also contained individual guarantees mirroring those in 
the Second Amendment, further suggesting that the right is not owned by the state, but rather the 
individual.28 
In addition to the Second Amendment’s text, individualists argue that the common law 
tradition supports their theory.  The 1689 English Bill of Rights and its successor, the 1742 
English Declaration of Rights explicitly articulate an individual right to keep and bear arms: “the 
subjects which are protestant may have arms for their defense suitable to their condition and as 
allowed by law.”29  Later, in his preeminent work, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Sir 
William Blackstone recognized the “right of the subject … [to] have[] arms for their defense” as 
one of the auxiliary rights which safeguarded absolute rights.30  By using the term “right of the 
subject,” Blackstone also unambiguously conveyed that the right to keep arms was an individual 
right.  In addition to these English sources, individualists also cite to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in United States v. Cruikshank,31 where the Court noted that “‘bearing arms for a lawful 
purpose’ … is not a right granted by the Constitution.  Neither is it in any manner dependent 
upon that instrument for its existence.”32  Scholars have suggested that this, read in conjunction 
with a similar passage regarding the First Amendment, supports the view that the individual right 
to bear arms predated the Constitution, and the Second Amendment merely enumerated the 
citizens’ preexisting individual right. 
Individualists also point to the few Supreme Court cases dealing with or mentioning the 
Second Amendment in defending their model.33  The first such case, Dred Scott v. Sanford,34 is 
offered to demonstrate that the Court understood that Second Amendment rights were 
understood to belong to the “people” in the same sense that First, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh 
Amendment rights, which are clearly individual in nature, belong to the “people.”35  The second 
oft cited case, United States v. Miller,36 suggests that the Court has implicitly recognized the 
individual rights model.  In Miller, the government asserted that the Collective Rights Theory 
should govern Second Amendment challenges; however, the court did not adopt the 
government’s argument, instead finding that the weapon in question was not an “arm” such that 
it the federal statute would trigger Second Amendment scrutiny.37 
c. The Limited Individual Rights or Sophisticated Collective Rights Model 
 
The Limited Individual Rights or Sophisticated Collective Rights Model suggests that the 
Second Amendment protects an individual right in the limited context of service in a state 
militia.38  This theory purports to be a hybrid, finding merit in parts of both the Collective Rights 
Model and the Individual Rights Model.39  Although supporters of this model defend it on 
grounds similar to the collective right supporters – the text and history of the Amendment, Miller 
and its progeny, and social concerns with an absolute individual right – the model is more 
defensible because its interpretation is more consistent with other constitutional provisions. 
Proponents of this model offer a very similar justification as that offered by Collectivists.  
They too claim support for the Sophisticated Collective Rights Model from the Amendment’s 
text and history and the Court’s Miller decision.  The Limited Individual Rights Model, however, 
is materially different from the Collective Rights Model in a crucial respect: the framework 
recognizes an individual right held by the “people” to keep and bear arms that is narrowly 
tailored to a citizen’s service in the state militia.  This key difference gains much credibility for 
the model over the purely collective view, as its use of the term “people” is consistent with its 
use elsewhere in the Constitution. 
The Limited Individual Rights Model has not been explicitly adopted by any federal 
circuits, although some commentators suggest otherwise.40  Courts have, however, disposed of 
some Second Amendment challenges on the grounds similar to the model’s premise: that the 
rights allegedly infringed were not incident to military service.  Critics of this scheme, however, 
have suggested that the limited individual rights position is merely an attempt by Collective 
Rights Model supporters to draw new lines in response to increasing scholarly support for the 
Individual Rights Model.41 
III. The Follow-up Question: What Standard of Review Applies to the Alleged 
Infringement of Second Amendment Rights? 
 
The companion question to the rights issue is that of the appropriate standard of review to 
be used to adjudicate Second Amendment challenges to federal and state42 laws.  The standard of 
review question will be crucial to the disposition of future Second Amendment litigation if the 
Court finds that the Second Amendment confers an individual right.  A strict standard could 
frustrate any legislative attempts to regulate the manufacture, distribution, and possession of 
firearms in the United States.  A lax standard, however, could make Second Amendment into an 
empty shell that only preserves theoretical rights.  If, however, the Court finds that the Second 
Amendment confers a collective right or an individual right connected only with militia service, 
then the importance of the standard of review question will be diminished based upon the narrow 
scope of the right.  Since the standard of review question would largely be mooted by a finding 
that the Second Amendment confers collective or limited individual rights, this Section will 
assume that an individual right attaches the Second Amendment.  Furthermore, this article 
assumes that the explicit right protected by the Second Amendment is the right to keep and bear 
arms for self-defense.43 
a. Strict Scrutiny 
The Court’s first available option would be to apply strict scrutiny to actions infringing 
upon the Second Amendment right.  If strict scrutiny were to attach, an allegedly infringing act 
will survive attack only if its proponent can prove the existence of a compelling governmental 
interest for the restriction and demonstrate that the restriction is necessary, or narrowly tailored, 
to furthering the interest.44  Strict scrutiny is a very high hurdle and is cleared in only a small 
subset of cases.45  The basis for applying strict scrutiny to the Second Amendment could be 
found either in the fundamental nature of the right, the importance of the right, or the status 
afforded to Bill of Rights Amendments.46 
Supporters claim that the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense is fundamental, and 
strict scrutiny should apply, based upon prior Supreme Court precedent and the fundamental 
nature of the right.  The Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence suggests that a right is 
fundamental where it is either “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” or “implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty.”47  The Court has already recognized fundamental rights in the 
arenas of contraception,48 marriage,49 parenting,50 and domestic travel,51 and most fundamental 
rights receive strict scrutiny review.52  Supporters suggest that the right to keep and bear arms is 
deeply rooted in the Nation’s history based upon the right’s placement in the Bill of Rights and 
numerous state constitutions, its foundations in the English common law, and mentions of the 
right in Supreme Court decisions.53  Alternatively, supporters also argue that the right is implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty.54  Blackstone himself specifically enumerated the right as 
necessary to “protect and maintain … personal security, personal liberty, and private property.”55  
Thus, since the right is both deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition and implicit in 
concepts of ordered liberty, supporters suggest that the right to keep and bear arms is a 
fundamental right deserving of strict scrutiny. 
Alternatively, supporters also argue that the right deserves strict scrutiny protection due 
to the importance of the Bill of Rights Amendments.  These supporters believe in strict scrutiny 
for the Second Amendment right based on the necessity of a “narrower scope for operation of the 
presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific 
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments.”56  This view is in 
accord with the Court’s application of strict scrutiny to many of the rights in the Bill of Rights; 
however critics are quick to point out that this rule is not absolute, as some rights in the first ten 
Amendments do not receive strict scrutiny.57  Supporters counter these critics by suggesting that 
strict scrutiny is the default standard by which Bill of Rights Amendments should be 
scrutinized.58  Through these arguments, proponents believe that the importance attached to the 
right’s embodiment in the Second Amendment should merit strict scrutiny protection. 
b. Undue Burden 
 
A second option would be to scrutinize laws allegedly interfering with the Second 
Amendment right under the Court’s “undue burden” standard from Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.59  The standard requires the act’s defender to prove that the 
“purpose or effect [of the infringing action] is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of [an 
individual exercising the right.]”60  The standard is less exacting than strict scrutiny, but it is still 
more rigorous than reasonable regulation / rational basis scrutiny.  Although the Supreme Court 
has only applied the undue burden analysis in the factual context of abortion rights, the rationale 
underlying the Casey opinion is similar to that underlying the right to keep and bear arms for 
self-defense; thus, the under burden analysis may be standard by which Second Amendment 
challenges could be adjudicated. 
Since Casey, the Court has not yet adopted the undue burden test as a governing standard 
of review for any rights outside of the abortion context.61  The plurality in Casey, however, 
recognized that the undue burden analysis can apply to fundamental rights and constitutionally 
protected liberty interests other than abortion.62  According to the Casey Court, undue burden 
scrutiny is an appropriate option where the right is one that can be regulated by the state in some 
manner without infringing upon the right.63  Like the abortion interest, the right to bear arms for 
self-defense is not absolute.  This fact is demonstrated by the Supreme Court’s restrictions on 
types of firearms in Miller, Blackstone’s ownership restrictions in his Commentaries, and the 
restricted right to keep and bear arms present in state constitutions passed in the late 18th 
Century.  Thus, by satisfying the Casey inquiry, one can make a colorable argument that Second 
Amendment challenges should be judged under undue burden scrutiny.  Furthermore, adopting 
the undue burden standard would still provide heightened review to infringements on the Second 
Amendment right, commensurate with the importance of a fundamental right.  This standard, 
however, would also give the government some leeway to enact non-burdensome restrictions 
that improve public safety or further other state interests. 
c. Reasonable Regulation / Rational Basis 
A third option would be to scrutinize laws allegedly interfering with Second Amendment 
rights under a rational basis or “reasonable regulation” standard.  Under rational basis review, “a 
law will be upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.”64  Similarly, 
under the reasonable regulation test, courts ask “whether the challenged law is a reasonable 
method of regulating the right to bear arms.”65  Although these two tests are slightly different, 
this Article will treat them as one because in practice, nearly all governmental restrictions on the 
individual ownership of firearms would be permitted under either standard.  This conclusion 
follows from the findings that the government firearm regulation would nearly always be 
reasonable and would be reasonably related towards the legitimate purpose improving public 
safety.  Most state courts have adopted some form of the reasonable regulation / rational basis 
standard as governing challenges to the right to keep and bear arms, even where the state 
constitutional provision explicitly preserves an individual right.66 
Reasonable regulation / rational basis scrutiny is most appropriate for “area[s] of general 
deference to the legislature.”67  Consistent with this philosophy, those who endorse the 
application of this test to Second Amendment rights argue that given the substantial threat to 
public safety posed by firearms, the most deferential of standards should be accorded to firearms 
regulation.68  Constitutional scholars, including Adam Winkler and Erwin Chemerinsky, have 
also suggested that the “Reasonable Regulation” standard, utilized by nearly all state courts to 
interpret analogous ‘right to bear arms’ provisions in state constitutions, is the appropriate test 
for Second Amendment challenges based upon its deferential posture.69 
d. Categorical Regulation 
In dealing with Second Amendment rights, another available tool in the kit would be to 
create categorical rules or regulations for the Second Amendment either in lieu of or in 
conjunction with a broad-based standard of review.70  Under categorical regulations, specifically 
indentified categories of conduct pertaining to the right are treated in a different manner than 
general conduct regarding the right.  Similar categorical rules have been implemented in other 
Bill of Rights Amendments, including the First Amendment’s freedom of speech framework, 
which employs strict scrutiny generally, but also contains categorical exceptions for obscenity, 
libel, and commercial speech.71  Importing categorical rules for Second Amendment rights could 
carve out situational rules dealing with specific issues, while not governing the entirety of the 
right. 
The idea of categorical rules for the Second Amendment has not been seriously explored 
by scholars or the courts; however, such rules would make sense given the parallels in rationale 
for their uses in the First and Second Amendments and the availability for such regulation for 
specific situations regarding Second Amendment rights.  The use of such categorical rules in 
First Amendment free-speech jurisprudence stems from a common understanding that the 
clause’s primary intent was to protect political speech, but had the incidental side-effects of 
protecting harmful speech such as obscenity and libel.  By promulgating categorical rules, the 
Court effectively maintained the important individual right while withholding protection from its 
abusive side-effects.  Similarly with the Second Amendment, it would be desirable to maintain 
the important individual right to bear arms for personal defense while withholding protection 
from harmful abuses of the right.  Furthermore, by reference to federal and state legislation, one 
can easily recognize candidates for such categorical restriction: limits on the number of firearms 
owned by one person; limits on types of firearms unsuitable for self-defense; and limits on 
possession for those who have demonstrated abuses of the right. 
To some degree, the Supreme Court has already imported categorical regulation onto the 
Second Amendment through the Miller case.  As mentioned supra, Miller carved out an entire 
area from the Second Amendment – weapons that are not “arms” under the Amendment – and 
held that they are not protected in any way by the amendment.  Miller’s approach mirrors the 
Court’s categorical approach to obscenity, libel, and commercial speech under the First 
Amendment to some degree; however, the Court has not endeavored to establish a “default” 
standard of review for when the categorical rule is inapplicable.  Supporters of categorical 
regulation argue that much of the social concerns with protecting a fundamental right to bear 
arms could be alleviated via categorical restrictions targeted at unsavory practices that wrongly 
claim protection under the right. 
IV. District of Columbia v. Heller 
In 1976, the District of Columbia passed arguably the most aggressive gun control 
legislative scheme in the United States.  Among other things, the legislation barred the 
registration of handguns,72 required firearms to be kept “unloaded and disassembled or bound by 
trigger lock” while in the home,73 and required firearm owners to carry their license with them 
whenever moving the firearm.74 
Prior to 2004, District of Columbia resident Dick Anthony Heller desired to keep a 
functional handgun in his home, and so he applied to the D.C. government for a handgun 
permit.75  The District of Columbia, however, rejected Heller’s application since Heller did not 
meet any of the exceptions to the general handgun prohibition, codified in D.C. Code § 7-
2502(a)(4).76  Believing that the handgun ban violated his Second Amendment right to keep and 
bear arms, Mr. Heller and five other plaintiffs sought to challenge the law by filing a declaratory 
judgment action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.77 
As the material facts were not disputed, both plaintiffs and defendants filed cross-motions 
for summary judgment and the district court decided the case in a 2004 opinion.78  In its opinion, 
the court recited the three prevalent models of interpreting the Second Amendment and 
recognized that neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit had explicitly adopted any of the theories.79  The court, however, rejected the 
Individual Rights Model, reasoning that only it was inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s Miller 
decision.80  The court also cited the persuasive authority of decisions from ten of the other eleven 
federal circuit courts and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which all explicitly rejected 
the Individual Rights Model.81  The court granted defendant’s motion, reasoning that since none 
of the plaintiffs were members of the District of Columbia militia, none have a Second 
Amendment right that might conflict with D.C. statutes.82 
Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit.  Before reaching the merits, the D.C. Circuit found that only Heller 
had standing on appeal because the other plaintiff-appellants had claimed prospective injuries; 
Heller, on the other hand, met standing requirements because had already been denied a handgun 
permit by the D.C. government.83  Upon addressing the merits, the court began by 
acknowledging the deep division between authorities on which model should be applied to 
challenges based upon the Second Amendment: the Collective Rights Theory being supported by 
most of the federal appellate courts and half of the state appellate courts that have weighed in on 
the issue; and the Individual Rights Theory being supported by a minority of federal appellate 
courts, half of the state appellate courts, and most twentieth and twenty-first century scholars.84  
The court gave particular emphasis to (1) the phrase “the people,” which is present also in the 
First, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments – all of which have been interpreted to confer individual 
rights; 85 and (2) the placement of the Amendment in the middle of the Bill of Rights, within the 
amendments preserving individual rights.86  The court further recognized that binding precedent 
hasn’t explicitly adopted one model, but most of the U.S. Supreme Court’s previous mentions of 
the Second Amendment all suggested that an Individual Rights Model was more appropriate than 
a Collective Rights Model.87  In adopting the Individual Rights Model, the D.C. Circuit became 
only the second circuit to recognize that the Second Amendment confers an individual right on 
citizens.88 
After announcing its adoption of the Individual Rights Model, the court also rejected 
respondent’s additional arguments.  Respondents argued that even if the Second Amendment 
confers an individual right, the Amendment does not apply to the District of Columbia because it 
is not a “free State”. 89  The court, however, held that the term “free State” referred to the United 
States as a country, not to individual states, and that in any event, the individual rights conferred 
by the Amendment applied to all American citizens, not just citizens of one of the several 
states.90  Respondents also proposed that an individual right under the Second Amendment 
would not invalidate the District of Columbia’s laws because modern handguns are not “arms” 
that are protected by the Second Amendment. 91  The court also rejected this argument, adopting 
the reasoning of sister circuits which have interpreted Miller to hold that most modern handguns 
are “arms” under the Amendment.92 
Judge Henderson dissented from the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Heller on the grounds that 
the Second Amendment is inapplicable to the D.C. laws because the District of Columbia is not a 
“state” for Second Amendment purposes.  The dissent held that since the District of Columbia is 
a creature of the federal government and not a free state, the purpose of the Amendment is 
frustrated.  Accordingly, the operative clause, guaranteeing the right to keep and bear arms must 
be inapplicable to the D.C. laws, and the district court’s grant of summary disposition to 
defendant-respondents should be affirmed.  Since the case could be decided on this ground, the 
dissent found it unnecessary to articulate whether the Second Amendment grants an individual, 
collective, or hybrid right.93 
Following the D.C. Circuit’s denial of an en banc rehearing, defendants petitioned the 
U.S. Supreme Court for writ of certiorari. 94  Defendants alleged that the certiorari was necessary 
to resolve a circuit split, as the court’s recognition of an individual right under the Second 
Amendment conflicted with the decisions of nine other federal circuits.95  Additionally, 
Defendants alleged that the D.C. Circuit’s opinion was erroneous on three points: (1) that the 
Second Amendment protects firearms possession only in connection with state militia service;96 
(2) that the Second Amendment only prohibits federal, and not state or local, interference with 
firearm possession rights;97 and (3) the D.C. laws would not violate the Second Amendment 
under any interpretive framework.98  Plaintiffs agreed that the Court should grant certiorari, but 
instead suggesting that it do so to correct federal and state appellate courts that have 
misinterpreted the Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence by denying the existence of a 
fundamental right to possess firearms.99  The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari; however, 
review was limited to the issue of “[w]hether the following provisions-D.C.Code §§ 7-
2502.02(a)(4), 22-4504(a), and 7-2507.02-violate the Second Amendment rights of individuals 
who are not affiliated with any state-regulated militia, but who wish to keep handguns and other 
firearms for private use in their homes.”100 
V. In deciding District of Columbia v. Heller, the U.S. Supreme Court Should 
Recognize that the Second Amendment Protects an Individual Right and the 
Court Should Adopt an Combined “Undue Burden” & Categorical Rules 
Standard of Review for Second Amendment Challenges 
 
In deciding D.C. v. Heller, the United States Supreme Court should recognize that the 
Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense and the 
Court should apply an “undue burden” standard of review with certain categorical regulations in 
scrutinizing the D.C. statutes.  The individual model makes the most sense because it is the best 
supported by the text and history of the Amendment and Supreme Court precedent.  
Additionally, a combination of categorical regulation and “undue burden” standard of review 
makes the most sense because it provides adequate protection to the fundamental rights in the 
Second Amendment, while providing limited latitude to governments to enact some firearm 
regulations. 
a. The Individual Right Model is the Most Consistent with the Text and History of 
the Amendment and Supreme Court Precedent 
 
As discussed in Part II, supra, all three models of Second Amendment rights can make 
colorable claims as to being supported by the text and history of the Amendment and Supreme 
Court precedent.  Upon weighing the relative strength of these claims, however, the Individual 
Rights Model clearly appears to be the most correct interpretation of the rights conferred in the 
Amendment.101  As such, the U.S. Supreme Court should hold that the Second Amendment 
confers an individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense onto all citizens, including Mr. 
Heller. 
Regarding textual arguments, the individualists’ use of the text of the Second 
Amendment is more complete than that of the individualists.  The collective model first suffers 
from the fatal flaw of reading the term “the people” in a manner inconsistent with the rest of the 
Constitution.  Under the collectivists’ model, one could make analogous arguments to 
collectivize individual assembly, search and seizure, and other unenumerated rights.  In as much 
as the hypothetical collectivization of other individual rights is absurd, so too is the notion that 
“the people” in the Second Amendment refers to anything other than individuals.  Second, 
Collectivists are unable to rationalize the placement of the right to bear arms with other 
individual rights in the beginning of Bill of Rights.  Finally, the collectivists’ strongest textualist 
argument, that the Individual Model wholesale disregards the Second Amendment’s preamble, is 
not fatal for Individualists because it was common practice at the time of the Amendment’s 
passage to insert preambles without affecting an act’s substantive rights.102 
The individual rights approach is also preferable because it is better supported by the 
history of Second Amendment than other models.  An individual right to self-defense is well 
supported by the common law tradition, as demonstrated in Blackstone’s writings and the 
English Declaration of Rights.  Furthermore, the fact that contemporaneous state constitutions 
adopted similar language that explicitly recognized an individual right to keep and bear firearms 
also strongly suggests that the framers sought to protect an individual right.  Finally, the 
historical events cited by collectivists and sophisticated individualists do not truly support the 
theory that the right belongs to the states or is limited to state militia service.  Instead, their 
sources, such as early Pennsylvania firearms regulations and anti-federalist texts, are more 
appropriately viewed as dealing with the appropriate standard of review with state’s efforts to 
regulate firearms. 
The Court should further adopt the individual rights view of the Second Amendment 
because it is more consistent with the Court’s precedent than either of the other models.  Though 
the nature of the rights issue is technically one of first impression, the Court’s prior decisions in 
Dred Scott and Miller provide persuasive support for individualists: Dred Scott positively 
suggests this position, while Miller implicitly rejects the counter-position.  Although collectivists 
give great predictive value to the number of federal appellate courts supporting their position, the 
collectivist position is weakened by a lack of support from Supreme Court cases.  Additionally, 
the more recent federal appellate decisions on the matter have taken the individualist position, 
further weakening the persuasiveness of collectivist federal appellate opinions.  Instead, the 
Court should remain consistent with the Dred Scott dicta and government’s rejected arguments 
in Miller by adopting the individualist model. 
b. Categorical Regulations with “Default” Undue Burden Scrutiny is the Most 
Consistent with Supreme Court Precedent, Constitutional Jurisprudence, and 
the Relevant Interests Involved 
 
As discussed in Part III, supra, scholars and courts have all made strong arguments as to 
what standard of review should govern acts that allegedly infringe on the Second Amendment.  
Given, however, the individual and fundamental nature of the right to keep and bear arms for 
self-defense and the government’s important counter-interest in public safety, undue burden 
scrutiny with certain categorical regulations clearly appears to be the most appropriate review 
standard for the Second Amendment.  As such, the U.S. Supreme Court in Heller should hold 
that the constitutionality of an act that allegedly infringes on the Second Amendment should 
depend on whether the purpose or effect of the act is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of 
an individual exercising his right to right to keep and bear arms for self-defense. 
As a threshold matter, regardless of the question of the level of scrutiny that the Court 
will adopt in Heller, the Court should, as it did for the First Amendment, adopt categorical rules 
for the Second Amendment that establish certain situations which are not protected by the 
Amendment: limits on the number of firearms owned by one person; limits firearms and 
accessories unsuitable for self-defense; and limits on possession for those who have 
demonstrated abuses of the right.  Just as the right to ‘free speech’ is focused on political speech 
and non-political speech is subject to categorical regulation, the right to ‘keep and bear arms’ is 
aimed at self-defense and these non-self-defense related uses must logically be subject to 
categorical regulation.  Furthermore, a categorical restriction on the type of arms protected by the 
Second Amendment is also necessary to adhere to the Court’s stare decisis in Miller, where the 
Court created a categorical restriction on the style of firearms protected by the Amendment. 
In addition to categorical regulations, the Court should also use Heller as an opportunity 
to adopt the undue burden test as the standard governing Second Amendment rights because it 
strikes an appropriate balance between the competing interests of the individual’s fundamental 
right to self-defense and the legislature’s interest in public safety.  On one hand, a rational basis / 
reasonable regulation standard is inappropriate to balance these interests because it is too 
deferential to the legislature and not mindful enough of the importance of the right.  Through 
application of these standards, there exists very few, if any, ‘unreasonable’ firearms laws and the 
Second Amendment’s fundamental right to self-defense becomes illusory at best. 103  On the 
other hand, strict scrutiny is also inappropriate because it would make the right nearly absolute, 
thereby preventing adequate accommodation of the government’s public safety interest.  Instead, 
both interests would be better served by an intermediate standard, the undue burden analysis, 
which properly focuses the inquiry on the effects of the government’s act on the individual’s 
exercise of the right.  In this manner, the undue burden standard recognizes the importance of the 
constitutional guarantee while still allowing for non-invasive governmental regulation. 
The Court should also adopt the undue burden analysis for Second Amendment 
protections based upon its fit with previous constitutional jurisprudence.  As mentioned supra, 
fundamental rights and constitutional guarantees from the Bill of Rights do not per se receive 
strict scrutiny; however, it is indeed rare for either to receive rational basis / reasonable 
regulation review.  Instead, as demonstrated by the Court’s adoption of the undue burden 
analysis in Casey, the Court is willing to instead review such important rights with a form of 
heightened review that falls short of strict scrutiny.  By doing this, and not applying rational 
basis / reasonable regulation analysis, the Court is also able to properly focus the inquiry on the 
importance and nature of the individual right instead of on the power of the legislature.  Since the 
right to keep and bear arms for self-defense purpose is similar in importance and stature to the 
rights involved in Casey, the Court has a similar basis to adopt the undue burden standard to test 
the constitutionality of the D.C. gun laws in Heller. 
VI. Impact of an Individual Rights Second Amendment Categorical Regulations / 
“Undue Burden” Framework on Existing Firearm’s Legislation 
 
Assuming that, for the reasons given above, the U.S. Supreme Court does indeed find that 
the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense in 
District of Columbia v. Heller, the Court’s decision will likely prompt a nationwide reevaluation 
of existing gun laws.104  Few scholars believe that the Court will announce a detailed framework 
by which firearm regulations should be evaluated;105 however, for the reasons given supra, 
inferior federal and state courts should evaluate the constitutionality of such regulations under 
categorical regulations and an undue burden test.  This section seeks to demonstrate how just 
such a framework would be applicable to the most common types of firearms regulation: conceal 
and carry permits; storage and safety requirements; mandatory waiting periods; and weapon-
style and accessory restrictions. 
a. Conceal and Carry Permits 
 
Today, 49 of the 50 states currently have enacted some form of concealed weapon 
regulation106 and some jurisdictions prohibit the practice by individuals outright.107  Prohibitions 
and outright bans on concealed weapons began in the early nineteenth century to combat a spike 
in violent crime, and similar justifications are given today in defense of the laws’ persistence.108  
Meanwhile, critics of such regulations refute the connection between concealed weapons and 
violence, instead suggesting that the deterrent effect of concealed weapons actually decreases 
violence.109  Under this Article’s proposed framework for the Second Amendment, however, this 
debate is moot; instead, the proper inquiry is whether an outright or partial ban on concealed 
weapons has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of individuals 
exercising their right to keep and bear arms for self-defense. 
Under the proposed framework, courts will likely uphold concealed weapon registration 
requirements but invalidate statutes that outright prohibit or significantly restrict one’s ability to 
carry a concealed weapon.  As a preliminary matter, registration requirements will likely be 
upheld provided that there is not an onerous waiting period, exurbanite fee, or other attached 
requirement that may inhibit exercise of the right.  More interesting, however, is the matter of 
concealed weapons bans.  Those who believe that these laws do not present an undue burden will 
argue that individuals can exercise the self-defense right to the same degree by wearing their 
firearms on their person in an unconcealed manner.110  Those who seek to invalidate the laws 
will counter this argument by saying that such an alternative would be unduly burdensome, as 
social customs generally disapprove of an individual displaying a firearm in public without some 
corresponding dangerous situation.  Under such laws, individuals would be presented with the 
non-choice of violating social norms by brandishing a firearm on their person or relinquishing 
their right by going without a firearm.  Thus, it is likely that this effective non-choice burdens the 
right and renders concealed weapons bans unconstitutional. 
b. Storage and Safety Requirements 
 
Currently, at least eighteen states have child access protection laws that “hold gun owners 
[criminally] liable if they leave guns easily accessible to children and a child improperly gains 
access to the weapon.”111  Under many of these statutes, the only sure-fire prevention against 
criminal liability is to (1) store the firearm in an unloaded condition; (2) lock the loaded firearm 
in a gun safe; (3) employ a gun-lock on the loaded firearm; or (4) store the loaded firearm in an 
inaccessible area.  The District of Columbia statutes at issue in Heller, similar to the other 18 
states, also require firearms to be kept “unloaded and disassembled or bound by trigger lock” 
while in the home.112  Again, like the social debate over concealed weapons laws, the debate 
over the merits of storage and safety requirements is moot under the proposed Second 
Amendment framework.  Instead, we are concerned with whether mandatory firearm storage and 
safety requirements have the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of 
individuals exercising their right to right to keep and bear arms for self-defense. 
Under the proposed framework, courts will likely uphold only those required firearm 
storage and safety measures that still allow for a firearm owner to make her weapon active in a 
timely manner such that she can adequately defend herself in event of an emergency.113  To 
arrive at this conclusion, we must first note the purpose for the Second Amendment right under 
the proposed framework is self-defense, and if this purpose is frustrated by laws or other 
regulations, then the right cannot be fully exercised and is unduly burdened.  Thus, the relevant 
inquiry for courts is whether the firearms storage and safety are so onerous that the firearm 
cannot be made ready for its intended purpose.  Under this test, it is likely that statutes requiring 
owners to keep guns unloaded or stored away from ammunition may fail, because it would take 
too long to load and prepare the firearm for self-defense against a home-invader.114  Less onerous 
restrictions, however, such as quick-enabled fingerprint gun safes may be upheld under this same 
test because they prepare the firearm for self-defense quickly enough for effective use by the 
individual.115  Thus, it is likely that the District of Columbia statute, and the statutes of other 
states, would be struck down; however, they may be replaced by other similar restrictions that 
achieve the same goals in firearm safety but also allow individuals to effectively exercise their 
Second Amendment right. 
c. Mandatory Waiting Periods 
 
Currently, eighteen states impose some waiting period for individuals wishing to 
purchase firearms for authorized dealers.  These waiting periods can be as short as two days 
(Wisconsin) to as long as six months (New York), or in some cases (Michigan) the waiting 
period is seemingly unlimited.116  The federal government also used to have a five-day 
mandatory waiting period under the Brady Act; however, in 1998, the waiting period was 
replaced by a requirement that dealers run an instantaneous background check via a federally-
administered eligibility database while the customer waits at the counter.117  Although such 
background checks are generally supported by all sides on gun debates, under this Article’s 
proposed framework for the Second Amendment, inquiry is still required as to whether 
mandatory waiting periods on firearms purchases have the purpose or effect of placing a 
substantial obstacle in the path of individuals exercising their right to keep and bear arms for 
self-defense. 
Under the proposed framework, courts will likely uphold mandatory waiting periods that 
only span a few days and will strike down mandatory waiting periods of over one week and 
those of an indefinite duration, provided that these waiting periods be waivable upon a showing 
of necessity.  Admittedly, it is difficult if not impossible to determine a precise period of time 
that demarks the point after which further waiting constitutes an undue burden on the right.  
Some would argue that any waiting time, be it minutes or hours, places an obstacle in the path of 
exercising the right.  A vivid example of this argument, as unrealistic as it may be, is that of an 
individual who knows that she is the target of an imminent attack and seeks to defend herself by 
immediately purchasing a firearm.  In that situation, a wait of any appreciable time would 
directly infringe upon her Second Amendment right.  Supporters of waiting periods, however, 
would argue that the more typical situation is that a purchaser does not have an immediate need 
for a firearm based upon self-defense concerns and a waiting period of a few days would 
consequently not burden the right.118  The tension between these two positions is likely resolved 
by reference to the Court’s opinion in Casey, which applied the same undue burden analysis.  In 
Casey, the Court upheld Pennsylvania’s requirement of a 24-hour waiting period for women 
seeking abortions, but only because the statute permitted the waiting period to be avoided “in the 
event of a medical emergency.”119  Similarly, here, short waiting periods for firearm purchases 
will likely be found permissible, so long as the waiting period is exempted for emergency self-
defense situations, such as the hypothetical described above.120 
d. Weapon-style and Accessory Restrictions 
 
A slew of federal laws have prohibited the sale and manufacture of many types of 
firearms, ammunition, and accessories based upon their particularly destructive nature.  
Currently, federal laws prohibit the sale of fully automatic weapons (manufactured after 1986), 
specific semi-automatic / assault weapons, weapons that do not trigger metal detectors, firearm 
silencer accessories, and certain super-strong ammunitions.121  Similarly, some states and 
municipalities, including the District of Columbia, have enacted prohibitions on individual 
possession and ownership of handguns.122  Like many other firearm restrictions, these statutes 
have been passed in response to the use of such firearms in criminal activities in an effort to curb 
the underlying crimes. 
Under the proposed framework, courts will likely uphold prohibitions on weapons that 
cannot be reasonably connected with the right to self-defense, such as automatic and semi-
automatic weapons and assorted accessories and ammunition, but they will strike down 
prohibitions on commonly accepted firearms used for self-defense, such as handguns.  As 
mentioned supra, the proposed framework has categorical rules for firearms that are not 
reasonably connected with self-defense purposes because such weapons are not reasonably 
connected with the Second Amendment right.123  Thus, federal and state regulations within this 
category are not subject to undue burden analysis and will likely survive diminished scrutiny.124  
Handguns, however, are reasonably connected with self-defense; thus, restrictions on handgun 
possession and ownership will not be subsumed into the categorical regulation and instead will 
face undue burden analysis.  Since handguns are likely the best choice of firearms for personal 
protection outside of the home, based on their portable size and concealability,125 handgun bans 
will likely be struck down as unduly burdening the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense. 
VII. Conclusion 
 
In deciding District of Columbia v. Heller, the United States Supreme Court should 
affirm the D.C. Circuit’s adoption of a Second Amendment individual rights analysis by 
specifically describing the Second Amendment as protecting the fundamental right to keep and 
bear arms for self-defense.  This classification of the right is well supported by the text and 
history of the Amendment, Supreme Court precedent, and the Court’s test for fundamental rights.  
Additionally, the Court in Heller should hold that the “undue burden” test should be the default 
framework under which the constitutionality of firearms legislation will be scrutinized, subject to 
certain categorical regulations.  This dual-track framework is well supported by analogous 
constitutional scrutiny schemes in the abortion and free speech arenas and is the most appropriate 
for the competing interests present in the Second Amendment realm. 
By explicitly recognizing the Second Amendment’s individual, fundamental right to keep 
and bear arms for self-defense and adopting a combination “undue burden” / categorical 
regulation scrutiny standard in Heller, the Supreme Court would make significant positive strides 
toward the desirable result of a cohesive and more complete Second Amendment jurisprudence. 
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